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BOOK
REVIEWS

ets of the jurisprudenceof the GermanConstitutionalCourt,ProfessorCurriehas
laid a solid foundationfor furtherexploration in the fertile field of comparative
constitutionallaw.
MARKUS DIRK DUBBER

SUNYBuffalo School of Law
JAMES W. ELY, The Chief Justiceship of Melville W. Fuller 1888-1910.
Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1995. xii, 248 pp.
$49.95.
The twenty-two year period of the Fuller Court has often been regardedas a
black hole of American Constitutionallaw whose twin low points are Plessy v.
Ferguson' and Lochner v. New York.2Much of the blame for its sorry performance has been laid at the doorstep of Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller who has
been describedas "the fifth best lawyer from the City of Chicago,"a phrasemeant
to heap praise neitheron the man nor the city. Its commitmentto economic development, marketinstitutionsand limited governmentmade it the targetof the progressive criticisms that bore fruit in the New Deal reforms less than two generations later.
Today the new rise of conservative (broadly conceived) thinking has challenged this dismal portrait of the Fuller Court on philosophical and economic
grounds. The conventional view of twenty years ago-that more government
leads to a better and more justice society-no longer capturesthe political imagination of vast portionsof the electorate, and the phrase "laissez-faire"once again
is seen as a badge of honor and not some dismissive epithet. The shift in these
broad political and philosophical undercurrentshave also broughtforth a parallel
revisionism in the legal history. Ely's fine book on Melville Fuller and the
SupremeCourtover which he presidedusefully complementsthe currenttheoretical counterattack. His patient, balanced and careful study should do much to
restore the Fuller Court to its fair measure of institutional and intellectual
respectability.
The first surprise is the evident quality of the man himself. Ely details
Fuller's skillful handlingof the often tense meetings among the Justices;his good
judgement in deciding whetheror when to accept Presidential,diplomaticor legal
assignments; his excellent oratory on ceremonial occasions; and the energy and
productivityof his own judicial labors. Here was a man whom Holmes thought
was the best Chief Justice underwhom he served.Whateverwe may have thought
about him, Fuller was no mediocrity.(pp. 53-54)
More to the point, Ely's balanced and careful picture of the major doctrinal
developments of the Fuller Court avoids the frequentsin of historical caricature.
His discussion, for example, of the Fuller Court's response to rate regulationof
the railroadsand public utilities effectively counters the view that the Court's due
process jurisprudencewas an unwarrantedand meddlesome interferencewith legislative prerogatives.He nicely chronicles the Court's hostile responseto the early
regulatoryoverreachingof the InterstateCommerce Commission; he accurately
reviews many of the major rate-of-returnregulationdecisions, culminatingSmyth
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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v. Ames,3 and he neatly turns the shoe on the other foot by noting that the Fuller
Court's respect for federalismoften induced it to keep hands off state rate regulations of a distinctlyconfiscatorynature.(pp. 83-94)
The Fuller Court's commitmentto federalismgoes a long way to explain the
Fuller's narrow(and correct)readingof the commerce clause in E.C. Knight Co.4
But that same concern did not requirethe Fuller Court to give an unnecessarily
narrow construction to the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of individual
rights against the state action. Yet throughout this period, Ely shows that the
Fuller Court often gave the takings clause a narrow reading by sustaining, for
example, Boston's height regulationon a dubious fire prevention rationale5and
providedscandalouslylittle protectionto owners of riparianrights.6(pp. 104-105)
More importantlyits deference to the state exercise of the police power led to the
disastroussupportof separate-but-equaldecision on Plessy and the forced separation of the races in Berea College v. Kentucky,7where the state's power to issue
corporatecharterson condition was used to force private institutions to practice
racial segregationagainsttheir will.
The clear lesson of this history is that the greatest sin of the conservative
Fuller Courtlay in its failure to take its jurisprudenceof individualrights and limited governmentfar enough. Lochnerstood for a narrowconception of the police
power:Plessy and Berea College stood for the far broaderone. No courtneeds any
ad hoc conceptions of fundamental rights or suspect classifications to guard
against legislative abuse if it applies a beefed-up Lochner across the board. An
abiding and consistent suspicion of state power could have spared this nation
much of its subsequentracial turmoil.Ely shows perhapstoo much sympathyfor
the Fuller Court's worst decisions and a bit too little praise for its best ones.
Notwithstandinghis own sound philosophical biases, he cannot quite bring himself to admit that Fuller Courtshould have pushed the strong and enduringprinciples of limited governmentto theirlogical and properconclusion.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN

The Universityof Chicago
STEPHENC. HALPERN,On the Limitsof the Law: TheIronic Legacy of Title VI
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1995. xiv, 391 pp. $55.00 (cloth). $18.95 (paper).
Stephen C. Halpern'sscholarly monographhas two great virtues. It is sound
in its treatmentof complex legal questions, and it presents and develops an interesting thesis. Yet one wonders about the audience for the book. Readers who are
not already knowledgeable about civil rights law will have to struggle with thick
legalistic prose, while experts in the field will already be familiar with much of
the story.
The book deals with the enforcement of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, a provision that authorizedthe denial of federal funds to any programthat
3. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
4. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).

5. Welch v. Swasey,. 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
6. See, e.g., Scrantonv. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900).
7. 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
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